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BANKRUPTCY
Hector Currie*
Effect of Discharge
Ettredge v. Sales Financing Management, Inc.,1 was an action
to cancel a judgment discharged in bankruptcy.2 The creditor had
obtained a deficiency judgment by default on September 21, 1966,
and the debtors received a discharge in bankruptcy on October
27, 1966. The trial court ordered the judgment cancelled. To ap-
pellant's contention that discharge in bankruptcy is an affirmative
defense which the debtor must plead,2 it was a sufficient answer
in the court of appeal that the discharge could not be pleaded
where it was not received until after judgment had been entered.
Cancellation of the judgment therefore was proper. If the dis-
charge had preceded judgment, the creditor's argument would
have prevailed.4
It is settled that a valid lien on property not administered
in bankruptcy (for example, exempt property or property aban-
doned by the trustee) is unaffected by the discharge. 5 In Trav-
elers Indemnity Co. v. Dubois,O plaintiff got judgment on Sep-
tember 17, 1968, in Rapides Parish, and had it recorded in that
parish. Defendant filed his petition in bankruptcy on January
6, 1969, scheduling among his debts the Rapides Parish judgment,
and among his assets some land in Grant Parish. He was dis-
charged on March 10, 1969. In May, 1969, plaintiff caused its
judgment to be made executory in Grant Parish and in August,
1969, defendant received his Grant Parish land, "subject to any
existing liens or mortgages," from the trustee. Action was brought
to subject the land to plaintiff's judgment, and defendant prayed
that plaintiff be enjoined from seizing and selling the land. An
injunction issued, and the court of appeal affirmed. Had the
debtor owned immovable property in Rapides Parish, the judicial
mortgage that arose on or after September 17, 1968, might have
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 247 So.2d 674 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
2. See LA. R.S. 9:5166 (Supp. 1970).
3. Bee LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1005.
4. Other cases illustrating this distinction are discussed In The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Bankruptcy, 31 LA.
L. REV. 307 (1971), and in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1968-1969 Term-Bankruptcy, 30 LA. L. REv. 267 (1970).
5. 1A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.29 (1971).
6. 236 So.2d 912 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
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been avoided as a lien obtained by legal proceedings on property
of an insolvent debtor within four months of his bankruptcy.7
If, however, the debtor was solvent on the date of recordation
of the judgment, the judicial mortgage would have subsisted,
despite the discharge, on any immovable property the debtor
owned in the parish where the judgment was recorded;8 but the
effect of the judgment could not be extended, after the discharge,
to land in another parish.
Debts Unaffected by Discharge
Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act lists categories of debt not
affected by a discharge. Section 17 begins: "A discharge in bank-
ruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts
* . . except ... .,,
American Road Insurance Co. v. Roux 0 was a subrogation
action for property damage, to which defendant pleaded dis-
charge in bankruptcy as an affirmative defense. The trial court
gave judgment for the defendant but was reversed on appeal.
Tort claims are not provable in bankruptcy except for those
that are reduced to judgment before bankruptcy, those that can
be asserted in quasi-contract, and actions of negligence instituted
prior to and pending at the date the petition in bankruptcy was
filed. 1 As the debt owed to the plaintiff came within none of
these exceptions, and thus was not provable in bankruptcy, it
was not discharged. Resolute Insurance Co. v. Underwood, 2 a
similar case,' 8 was followed by the court of appeal.
Section 17a(2) provides in part:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all of his provable debts . . .except such as . . . (2) are
liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses
or false representations, or for obtaining money or property
on credit, or obtaining the extension or renewal of credit in
reliance upon a materially false statement in writing re-
7. 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1964).
8. Schexnailder v Fontenot, 147 La. 467, 85 So. 207 (1920).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1964).
10. 242 So.2d 95 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
11. U.S.C. § 103(a)(1), (4), (7) (1964).
12. 230 So.2d 433 (La. App. 1st ir. 1970), cert. denied, 255 La. 809, 233
So.2d 249.
13. For comment, see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1969-1970 Term-Bankruptoy, 31 LA L. REv. 307 (1971).
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specting his financial condition made or published or caused
to be made or published in any manner whatsoever with
intent to deceive .... ",14
In an action brought by a creditor on a properly scheduled
claim after his debtor's bankruptcy, the plaintiff, in order to de-
feat a plea of discharge in bankruptcy, has been required to
show: "(1) [t]hat defendant made false representations; (2)
that these representations were made with the intention of de-
frauding the plaintiff, and (3) that the plaintiff relied upon and
was misled by the false pretenses or representations.'"
One such recent case's was reversed to give the defendant
an opportunity, denied him in the trial court, to present evidence
of his good faith. Another such case' 7 was remanded for recep-
tion of newly discovered evidence of defendant's alleged bad
faith. In a third case,1 8 plaintiff failed to prove reliance on the
financial statements.
Section 17a (3) provides:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all of his provable debts . . . except such as . .. (3) have
not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance,
with the name of the creditor if known to the bankrupt un-
less such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the
proceedings in bankruptcy .... "I
Tamborella v. Robison" held that a claim was duly sched-
uled, hence discharged, where the only address given was
"Shreveport, La." The court of appeal called on Kreitlein v.
Ferger,21 where the United States Supreme Court found "a sched-
ule listing the creditor's residence as Indianapolis . . . at least,
prima facie sufficient"22 in the absence of proof that the bank-
rupt knew the complete address. Further, the court of appeal
14. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (1964).
15. De Latour v. Lala, 15 La. App. 276, 278, 131 So. 211, 212 (Orl.oCir. 1930).
16. CHF Fin. Disc. A Co. v. Brasseux, 237 So.2d 701 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1970).
17. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Hill, 242 So.2d 580 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1970).
18. Friendly Fin. Serv. Mid-City, Inc. v. Windham, 240 So.2d 26 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 257 La. 171, 241 So.2d 530.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(3) (1964).
20. 245 So.2d 476 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 258 La. 761, 247
So.2d 862.
21. 238 U.S. 21 (1915).
22. Id. at 34.
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added, it is the duty of the referee to "examine all schedules ...
and cause such as are incomplete and defective to be amended.
. . ."2 In the first place, however, it is the bankrupt's duty to
"prepare ... a list of all his creditors . . . showing their resi-
dences or places of business, if known, or if unknown that fact
to be stated ... ,",24 and where he has done neither the one thing
nor the other it seems doubtful that he has duly scheduled the
claim.25 Nor is the bankrupt exculpated by the referee's inaction.
Kreitlein v. Ferger is a dubious decision, which is not to say
that the court of appeal was wrong to follow it.
In Livingston State Bank & Trust Co. v. Fairchild,26 the
bankrupt had properly scheduled a judgment that the bank-had
obtained against him as maker of a note, but had failed to sched-
ule an accommodation endorser as a creditor. An accommoda-
tion party is a contingent creditor entitled to reimbursement
for any payment required of him, and this claim is provable"
in the bankruptcy of the maker as a debt founded on an implied
contract.28 If the indorser had been held to payment and then
had sued the maker for reimbursement, discharge in bankruptcy
would not have been available as a defense. What happened,
however, was that the bank assigned its judgment to the indorser
without the bankrupt judgment debtor's knowledge, and the as-
signee enforced the judgment by garnishment. The debtor then
moved to dissolve the garnishment on the ground that the judg-
ment had been discharged in bankruptcy. He lost in the trial
court but prevailed on appeal. Where a debtor has no knowledge
of the assignment, he may duly schedule the debt in the name
of the original creditor, and he is under no duty to ascertain in-
dependently whether or not an assignment has been made.29
It should be noted that in all the foregoing cases bankruptcy
occurred before December 18, 1970, the effective date of Public
Law 91-467. Among other changes, this latest amendment to the
Bankruptcy Act empowers courts of bankruptcy to determine
the dischargeability of any debt; to render judgment for a non-
dischargeable debt and order enforcement of the judgment; to
23. 11 U.S.C. § 67(a)(3) (1964).
24. Id. § 2.5(a)(8).
25. Cf. 1A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.23[41 (1971).
26. 248 So.2d 14 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
27. Irn re Seigel, 43 F. Supp. 778 (N.D. Ga. 1942).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 103(4) (1964).
29. A W. COLLmR, BANKRUPTCY § 17.23[31 (1971).
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nullify any judgment as a determination of personal liability on
a discharged debt; and to enjoin creditors from suing on, or using
any process to collect, a discharged debt.
Promise to Pay Discharged Debt
In Louisiana, 0 and generally, a new promise to pay a debt
discharged in bankruptcy is actionable without new considera-
tion;81 and giving a new note for a discharged debt amounts to
such a promise.8 2 In Port Finance Co. v. Daigle,85 the debtor
signed a new note and the creditor gave new consideration, but
the debtor had been coerced into signing, or so the jury believed.
In reversing a judgment for defendant, the court of appeal held,
over a vigorous dissent, that the evidence did not support the
verdict.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Robert A. Pascal*
Alimony
de Lavergne v. de Lavergne1 presents a fascinating problem
evoking meditation on the bases of "conflict of laws" rules. A
wife domiciled in Louisiana sued ex parte in Louisiana for a
judgment of separation from bed and board from her husband
domiciled in France. In the same suit she asked for alimony
according to Louisiana law. The defendant husband not being
present in the state or expected to appear voluntarily, the plain-
tiff wife, treating her cause of action for alimony as one for
money, proceeded quasi in rem by attaching the defendant hus-
band's beneficial interest in a Louisiana trust. A judgment for
alimony in the amount of $600 monthly followed, but no attempt
was made to enforce payments until $5400 was due. The wife
then asked for and received a judgment ordering execution of
the whole out of the husband's beneficial interest in trust at-
tached on the commencement of suit. The husband thereupon
alleged the nullity of the original alimony judgment, contending
that a suit for alimony is not one "for money" which might be
30. Irwin v. Hunnewell, 207 La. 422, 21 So.2d 485 (1945).
31. 1A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.33 (1971).
32. Booty v. Amer. Fin. Corp., 224 So.2d 512 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
33. 236 So.2d 256 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 244 So.2d 698 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
